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INTRODUCTION 
It has recently become clear that ideas and methods from 
the theory of cooperative games can be used quite successfully 
to solve cost allocation problems. Among the extensive litera- 
ture (see Loughlin, 1977) dealing with this subject we shall 
concentrate on an article based on work carried out at IIASA 
(Young et al., 1980). The authors of this article used game 
theory principles of rationality to solve the problem of sharing 
the cost of a joint municipal water supply system among the group 
of Swedish municipalities participating in the project. 
In Section 1 we introduce the notion of the generalized 
nucleolus. The nucleolus and all its known mcdifications are 
special cases of our definition. Section 2 describes a method 
for calculating the nucleolus that can be readily implemented 
on a computer, and Section 3 puts forward an analytical criterion 
for testing the results. In Section 4 we describe some applica- 
tions of the method to linear-fractional excess functions and 
convex games, and a number of formulas for three-person games 
are also given. Section 5 contains numerical results for seven 
modifications of the nucleolus for the six-person game discussed 
in Young et al. (1980). 
1. DISCUSSION OF FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS 
A classical cooperative game concerns a pair (J,v) which 
consists of a set J = {1,2, ..., n) of n players and a character- 
istic function v(S) which maps every subset S of J, called a 
coalition, onto a nonnegative number (for example, the coalition's 
largest guaranteed payoff). The outcome of a cooperative game 
will be a coalition of n players and a payoff vector, i.e., all 
players will share a common payoff. Usually the payoff vector 
(imputation) is assumed to be individually rational, which means 
that no player will accept a value less than his own guaranteed 
payoff. The imputations are therefore elements of the following 
set: 
> v(i) for all i E J  . x = ]XER"I 1 xi = V(J) ,xi -
iEJ f 
The main problem of cooperative game theory is to formalize 
the way in which the possibilities of each coalition (described 
by v(S)) may be converted to the possibilities of individual 
players (given in terms of imputations from the set X). The aim 
of the investigation is to calculate an imputation or a set of 
imputations that is in some sense optimal. The most popular 
principles of rationality used in cooperative game theory are 
the core, the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the Shapley value, 
and the nucleolus and its various modifications. 
In the particular application of cooperative game theory 
considered here, the players are the users of water (regions, 
municipalities and so on) and the char~~cteristic function is 
interpreted as the least cost c(S) of serving coalition S of 
users, that is, the cost of constructing and operating a joint 
facility to supply coalition S. It is assumed that the amount 
c(S) is sufficient to meet the water demand of each member of 
the coalition. The water demand of users is calculated on the 
basis of factors such as population, industrial requirements, 
and so on. 
By analogy to the set X, let the set of cost allocations be 
defined as follows: 
< c(i) for all i E ~ l  . Y = l Y ~ ~ n ~  1 yi = C(J) .yi-
i€J 
Classical cooperative game theory as a rule operates with 
the game in 0-normalized form. This means that v(i) = 0, i € J; 
0 - < v(S) - < v(J), S C J. If, in addition, v(J) = 1, then the game 
is said to be in (0,l)-normalized form. 
The following mapping is used to reduce the characteristic 
function c(S) to 0-normalized form: 
A cost allocation y corresponding to c(S) is associated with 
an imputation x by the following formula: 
One can easily see that the cost of serving any group of 
users may be less than the sum of the costs of serving them in- 
dividually, especially when the users are neighbors. This case 
is represented as follows: 
The function c(S) is assumed to be superadditive, which in game 
theory means that 
where 
because the possible ways of serving S together with T include 
the possibility of serving S alone and T alone. 
It is shown by Young et al. (1980) that the nucleolus and 
its different modifications (see Schrneidler, 1969, and Shapley 
and Shubik, 1973) are the methods from game theory most applicable 
to cost allocation problems. In the present paper a definition 
of the generalized nucleolus is given (all known modifications 
of the nucleolus are special cases of this form) and a method 
for calculating it is suggested. 
We shall now introduce some definitions from Young et al. 
(1980). It is natural to denote 
Assume 
Following Shapley and Shubik (1973), we define the least core 
as a set of vectors y which are optimal solutions of the follow- 
ing linear programming (1.p.) problem: 
min E 
The core (C) is the set of allocations y which satisfy all 
the constraints of problem (4) with e = 0. 
If problem (4) has multiple solutions the following tie- 
breaking device may be used. For any allocation y and coalition 
S, define the excess of S relative to y to be 
Let el (y) be the largest excess of any coalition relative to y, 
e2(y) the next largest excess and so on. The nucleolus is a cost 
allocation y for which 
- 
€1 (Y) 5 €1 (Y) for all YET 
for all y satisfying (5) 
- 
~ ~ ( y )  5 c3(y) for all y satisfying (5) and ( 6 )  (7) 
and so on. 
We should perhaps comment on some aspects of this definition 
of the nucleolus. 
1. The definition of the nucleolus given above may produce a 
vector which is not, in general, a cost allocation from Y but 
only from because the condition of individual rationality may 
not be observed. If the characteristic function is such that the 
core is not empty or, in other words, if the optimal E in problem 
(4) is not positive, then every allocation YEY which is optimal 
in (4) is a member of Y. This is not necessarily the case when 
the optimal E is positive. 
This fact can be illustrated by the following simple example. 
Let 
where 
= q>o. s # {2,3), {4,5) and c(J) - ~ ( 1 )  - c(2t3) - c(4f5) -
Then, for an allocation y to be optimal in problem (41, the fol- 
lowing condition must be true: 
To fulfill the condition of individual rationality we include the 
inequalities 
as constraints in problem (4) . 
2. We reproduce below a table from Menshikova (19741, which 
gives the nucleolus of an arbitrary three-person game in (0,l)- 
normalized form. Here v(1,3) = a, v(1,2) = h, ~ ( 2 ~ 3 )  = d and , 
without loss of generality it is assumed that 
TABLE 1 The nucleolus of an arbitrary three-person 
game in (0,l) -normalized form. 
Conditions Nucleolus 
1-d 2h+d+l-2a 2a+d+l-2h for 2a+d > 1 I 
- 4 4 
I for 2h+d<l 
for 2a+d<1' 
It can be seen from Table 1 that the least core consists 
of more than one point when 
2h+d > 1 
More precisely, the least core is the following set: 
1-d d+h 1-h 
The set of parameters defined by condition (9) has full 
dimension and no small variation of the characteristic function 
can reduce the least core to a single point. 
The c-proportional least core is the set of allocations y 
which are optimal solutions of the 1.p. problem: 
min r 
Finally, the weak least core is the set of optimal allocations 
for the following 1.p. problem: 
min 6 
Generalizing the definitions from Young et al. (1980) and 
taking into account point 2 above, we shall define the general- 
ized least core as the following set: 
~[d(S)l = {yly is optimal in (12)) 
where 
min u 
y(S) < ud(S) + c (S) , 
- 
S C J  
y(J) = c(J) 
< c(i) , Yi - i e J  . 
We shall now give an equivalent definition of the set 
L[d(S) I : 
L[~(S) I = {y(x) ( x  is optimal in (13) ) 
min u 
ud(S) + x(S) - > v(S) , S C J  
where y (x) is the mapping (2) and v (S) is calculated from (1) . 
It is easy to see that the sets ~ [ l ] ,  L[C(S)I, L[v(S)I, and L [ ~ S ( I  
are the least core, the c-proportional least core, the proportional 
least core from Young et al. (1980), and the weak least core, 
respectively. 
It is natural to define the proportional, c-~ro~ortionalt 
and weak nucleolus by analogy with the nucleolus. These modifica- 
tions all come under the broad-heading of the generalized nucleolus 
(Menshikova, 1976) . 
Definition of the generalized nucleolus 
1 
Fix some set M CzJ and a function d: M +R+ , where M is the 
set of all permissible coalitions and d(S) > 0 is the normalizing 
multiplier for a coalition S EM. For a fixed game ( J,V) and 
vector x let 8(x) be a vector with components 
arranged according to their magnitude, where S E M I  i.e., i < j 
implies Bi(x) > 8. (XI. We say that a vector 8 (x) does not lex- 
- 7 
icographically exceed 8 (z) (8 (x) < 8 (2) ) if the first nonzero 
component of the vector 8 (2) - 8 (x) is positive. Let the gener- 
alized nucleolus be the set N[M,d] of points corresponding to 
the lexicographical minimum of the function 8(x) over the set X. 
More precisely, 
N[M,dl = {x~xl8(x)d 8(z) for all ZEX) . 
J It is obvious that when M = 2 and d(S) : 1 the set N[M,d] 
consists of one point - the nucleolus. 
2. METHOD OF COMPUTATION 
The computation of the nucleolus is a problem of linear 
lexicographical optimization and has been discussed in a large 
number of studies. For example, Kopelowitz (1967) suggested 
solving the sequence of 1.p. problems generated by the definition 
of the nucleolus. In .addition, Kohlberg (1971) and Owen (1974) 
have shown how to construct a single 1.p. problem with the prop- 
erty that its unique solution is the nucleolus. This problem 
has not less than 4" + 1 constraints and 2 + n variables, and 
the authors themselves underline the fact that a computer reali- 
zation of this method is extremely complicated even for small 
values of n. Here we formulate a sequence of 1.p. problems such 
that the set of solutions of the last problem coincides with the 
generalized nucleolus. We also consider the corresponding sequence 
of dual 1.p. problems. Below we use x(S) to denote the charac- 
teristic vector of a coalition S, i.e., xi(S) = , iES, ~ E J .  
0, i g S  
Problem 1 
min u 
The dual formulation of this problem is 
Problem 1 ' 
max F1 (A) 
Problem 1' has a solution, and from the first duality 
theorem (Udin and Golshtein, 1964) the optimal values of the 
objective functions in problems 1 and 1' must be equal (this 
value is denoted by TI). 
The S-th condition of problem 1' is described as free if 
there exists an optimal vector A such that AS > 0, where SEM. 
Let M1 be the set of all free conditions of problem 1'. Then 
the second duality theorem (Udin and Golshtein, 1964) tells us 
that for any vector x optimal in problem 1 it is necessary that 
The set of all imputations which are optimal in problem 1 coin- 
cides with the generalized least core and can be described as 
the set of solutions to the following linear system: 
It is interesting that the extreme points of the polyhedron 
described by the constraints of problen 1' are vectors A 1 0  - that 
turn vector inequality (14) into an equality. In game theory 
these vectors are known as minimal balanced (m.b.) collections 
(Bondareva, 1963), and their properties for games with a small 
number of players are well known. This allows us to obtain an 
analytical expression for the generalized nucleolus. Table 1, 
for example, was constructed in this way. 
We use the following definition of a minimal balanced col- 
lection. A matrix A with R rows, n columns and elements equal 
to 0 or 1 is called a balanced collection (of degree R xn) if 
there is a positive vector X and a positive number a such that 
A balanced collection can be described as minimal if the 
rows of the matrix are linearly independent. 
If A is a minimal balanced collection and a is a fixed 
number, then vector X is uniquely determined. This vector is 
also sometimes described as a minimal balanced collection. 
For example, the set of all minimal balanced collections 
of degree R x 3, where R - < 3, is listed as follows: 
If the optimal extreme point in problem 1 '  is a minimal 
balanced collection of degree n xn then the generalized least 
core consists of a single point which is the generalized nucleolus. 
The generalized least core and nucleolus also coincide when 
MI = M. In other cases it is necessary to consider the second 
1.p. problem in order to calculate the generalized nucleolus 
and so on. 
Let us formulate the k-th 1.p. problem of this sequence, 
assuming that the generalized nucleolus coincides with its solution. 
Problem k 
min u 
k- 1 
ud(s) + X(S) ?v(S) S E M \  u M 
j = 1  j 
The dual formulation of this problem is 
Problem k' 
max Fk(A) 
where 
Let Mk be the set of all free conditions of problem k'. The 
generalized nucleolus is then the set of solutions of the follow- 
ing linear system: 
k 
where either M = U M .  or system (1 5) has a unique solution. 
j=1 3 
The above considerations therefore suggest that the gener- 
alized nucleolus can be calculated in two ways: by solving 
problems 1 -k or problems 1 ' -kt . 
We shall denote by k[M,d(S)] the minimum number of 1.p. 
iterations required to calculate the nucleolus. 
The Stop R u l e .  k[M,d(S)] is equal to the smallest R for which 
the optimal extreme solutions of problems 'R and (R+1) coincide. 
In our opinion, the second method of calculation (solution 
of problems 1'-k') is preferable to the first. We have already 
mentioned that it has an advantage in the construction of tables 
for the generalized nucleolus when n is small. The second ad- 
vantage has to do with the fact that the sets of basic solutions 
in problems 1',2', ..., k' change only slightly: these solutions 
are minimal balanced collections in all problems and only the 
multipliers a are changed from step to step. In addition, the 
set of feasible solutions to problems 1'-k' does not depend on 
v(S) and hence is the same for all problems concerned with the 
same set M of coalitions. Finally, the second method of calcula- 
tion is more suitable for computer realization. 
3. ANALYTICAL CRITERION 
The connection of the problems 1',2', ..., k' with the notion 
of minimal balanced collections makes it possible to formulate a 
sequence of conditions necessary for a vector x to be from the 
generalized nucleolus. If we take these necessary conditions 
togsther we can obtain a sufficient condition for the generalized 
nucleolus to contain x. 
Consider an imputation x for which 
Let M. (x) be the matrix with rows which are vectors x(S) for S 
3 
such that 
The first necessary condition for x€N[M,d]  
Matrix Ml(x) is a balanced collection and associated vector 
X is a solution of the equation: 
Proposition I .  Let x be the unique solution of the system 
Then 
If the system 
has multiple solutions and if 
the following necessary condition may be useful. 
The k-th necessarv condition for x ~ N [ . M , d l  
By adding certain rows of the matrices M.(x), 1 5 j 5 k-1 to 3 
matrix Mk(x) it is possible to obtain a balanced collection A 
for which Fk(A) = Tk(x). 
Proposition 2. Let x be the unique solution of system (1 6) . 
Then N[M,d.] = {XI. 
Thus we have a constructive method for testing whether a 
given imputation x is in the nucleolus. No computer is neces- 
sary when this method is used for problems with small n because 
in this case complicated calculations are not needed. 
4. APPLICATIONS OF THE METHOD 
The above method for calculating the generalized nucleolus 
is not limited to excess of the type eO(s,x) as defined earlier. 
For example, Littlechild and Vaida (1966) propose to use the 
excess function 
Proposition 3. For an arbitrary superadditive game ( J,V) the 
set N [M,G] coincides with N [M, y] , where 
J Proposition 4. For any three-person game, the set N[2 ,y] is 
equal to the vector 
It is easy to generalize Proposition 4 for an n-person game 
with the following set of permissible coalitions: 
Proposition 5. For an arbitrary superadditive game (J,v) the 
set N [h, y] is equal to the vector 
The function y(S,x) has an interesting interpretation for 
convex games, i.e., games for which the inequality 
holds for any pair of coalitions Sf T (Shapley, 1971). 
The core is not empty in a convex game. The difference 
between maximum and minimum values of x(S) when imputation x 
varies in the core is then called the range (R(S)) of a coali- 
tion S. 
Thus 
R(S) = max x(S) - min x(S) . 
x€c XEC 
It is easy to check that the functions U (S) = max x (S) and 
u(S) = min x (S) are related by the formula: xEC 
xEC 
The range R(S) of a coalition S is equal to the maximum 
surplus payoff above the guaranteed level u(S) - > v(S), when 
only imputations from the core are considered. 
Now let us introduce a new excess function y(S,x) defined 
by 
When x belongs to the core the value -7 (s,x) is not greater than 1. 
This value is therefore a measure of how successfully a coalition 
S operates within the framework of the core. 
For these reasons we suggest N [ M , ~ ]  as a rationality prin- 
ciple for games with a non-empty core. 
If a game is convex then u(S) = v(S) (Shapley, 1971), so 
that Y(S,X) = y(S,x). Convex games also have another interesting 
feature: 
Proposition 6. The optimal solution of problem 1 may be found 
in the class of minimal balanced collections A composed of par- 
titions or their complements, i.e., for every pair S , T € A  either 
S n T  = !J or (J\S) n (J\T) = gf. 
This proposition has an important consequence. Of all the 
minimal balanced collections mentioned in Proposition 6, there 
are only two of degree n xn: 
Thus, as a rule, it is necessary to solve more than one 1.p. 
problem to calculate the generalized nucleolus of a convex game. 
Proposition 6 may be proved with the help of Proposition 7: 
Proposition 7. Let A be a balanced collection. If for every pair 
S,TEA one of the following three conditions is true 
1. S C T  or T > S  
2. s n ~  = !J 
3. S U T  = J 
* 
then A E Conv 8, where 8 = (A ( A defined in Proposition 6). 
* 
Conv P denotes the convex hull of set P. 
Using minimal ba lanced  c o l l e c t i o n s  w e  may prove P r o p o s i t i o n  8: 
Proposition 8. I f  f o r  any c o a l i t i o n  S  C J  t h e  fo l l owing  c o n d i t i o n  
i s  t r u e ,  t hen  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  n u c l e o l u s  i s  g iven  by t h e  formula 
where M i s  a  s u b s e t  o f  2J which c o n t a i n s  a l l  one-person c o a l i t i o n s .  
CoroZZary. I f  v  (S )  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  
t h e n  t h e  n u c l e o l u s  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  v e c t o r  
Table  2  g i v e s  t h e  weak n u c l e o l u s  o f  an a r b i t r a r y  th ree -person  
game ( a , h ,  and d  have t h e  same meaning a s  i n  Table  1 ) .  
TABLE 2  The weak n u c l e o l u s  of  an  a r b i t r a r y  t h r e e -  
pe rson  game. 
Condi t ions  Weak n u c l e o l u s  
We shall now give a table for the c-proportional nucleolus 
assuming that c(S) is superadditive and that some technical condition 
is always true for some ordering of players. 
TABLE 3 The c-proportional nucleolus of an arbitrary 
three-person game. 
Conditions c-Proportional nucleolus 
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
We shall now consider in detail the game from Young et al. 
(1980), which arose from the problem of sharing water costs among 
a group of Swedish municipalities. A careful study of local con- 
ditions led to the grouping of the 18 municipalities into 6 in- 
dependent units A, H, K, L, M, T, consisting respectively of 
5, 4, 2, 1, 3, 3 municipalities. The characteristic function 
c(S) for this 6-person game is given in Young et al. and the 
corresponding values reproduced in Table 4, together with the 
values of v (S) calculated from equation (1 ) . 
Our definition of the generalized nucleolus permits us to 
limit our attention to some subset M of the set of all coalitions 
J 2 rather than considering the whole set. We shall use this fact 
and the characteristic function v(S) in the calculation that 
follows. 
Assume 
M =  E S C J I  either I S (  = 1 or v(S) >0) . 
TABLE 4 Values of c(S) and v(S) for various coalitions S. 
AHK 
AHL 
AHM 
AHT 
AKL 
AKM 
AKT 
ALM 
ALT 
AMT 
HKL 
- 
HKM 
HKT 
HLM 
HLT 
HMT 
KLM 
KLT 
KMT 
LMT 
AHKL 
AHKM 
AHKT 
AHLM 
AHLT 
AHMT 
AKLM 
AKLT 
AKMT 
ALMT 
HKLM 
HKLT 
HKMT 
HLMT 
KLMT 
AHKLM 
AHKLT 
AHKMT 
AHLMT 
AKLMT 
HKLllT 
AHKLMT 
It is evident that 
so we can reduce the number of coalitions under consideration 
from 62 to 48. 
An algorithm based on the above method was implemented in 
the LP-BESM-6 system and used to compute the generalized nucleolus. 
The numerical results obtained are given in Table 5, together 
with the number k of 1.p. problems solved in each case. 
TABLE 5 The values of y and x for the nucleolus, the weak 
nucleolus., the c-proportional nucleolus, and the 
proportional nucleolus. 
Method A H K L M T k 
Nucleolus 4 
Y 20.35, 12.06, 5.00, 8.61, 18.32, 19.49 
x 1.6, 5.02, 5.91, 7.27, 2.49, 2.49 
Weak 
Nucleolus 
Y 
X 
c-Proportional 
Nucleolus 
Proportional 
Nucleolus 
It is reasonable to consider two more variants of the gen- 
eralized nucleolus. The following variants of the function d(S) 
are based on additional information about the problem. Let Pi 
represent the population and Di the water demand of the i-th 
group of municipalities. Then 
P(S) = 1 pi and D(S) = 1 Di 
i€S ~ E S  
The function d(s) is additive in both of the above cases 
as well as when d(S) = IS[, and so the corresponding nucleoli 
are monotonic (in the sense meant by Young et al.). We therefore 
suggest that the first approach should be called the proportional- 
to-population nucleolus rather than the proportional-to-population 
allocation method (as in Young et al.) and, similarly, the second 
approach should be known as the proportional-to-demand nucleolus 
instead of the proportional-to-demand allocation method. In 
general, the function d(S) makes it possible to use more statistics 
without losing attractive game theoretical features. 
To conclude, we shall give a table of all the modifications 
of the nucleolus calculated for two values of v(J). 
TABLE 6 Results obtained for all modifications of the 
nucleolus, calculated for v ( J )  = 2 4 . 7 9  and v ( J )  = 2 0 . 7 9 .  
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